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Abstract: Management tools are often argued to ameliorate public service performance. Indeed, evidence has emerged 
to support positive outcomes related to the use of management tools in a variety of public sector settings. Despite these 
positive outcomes, there is wide variation in the extent to which public organizations use management tools. Drawing 
on normative isomorphism and contingency theory, this article investigates the determinants of both organization-
oriented and client-oriented management tool use by top public sector executives. The hypotheses are tested using 
data from a large-N survey of 4,533 central government executives in 18 European countries. Country and sector 
fixed-effects ordinary least squares regression models indicate that contingency theory matters more than normative 
isomorphism. Public executives working in organizations that are bigger and have goal clarity and executive status are 
more likely to use management tools. The only normative pressure that has a positive impact on management tool use 
is whether public sector executives have a top hierarchical position.
Evidence for Practice
• Management tool use might be a norm that public sector executives feel is required of them to be considered 
“professional” top managers.
• Similarly, management tool use might be influenced by the contingencies of the organization in which 
public sector executives work.
• Our results indicate that an organization’s contingencies better predict management tool use by public sector 
executives than normative pressures.
• In order to stimulate management tool use in public organizations, public sector executives working  
in smaller organizations that have more ambiguous goals and nonexecutive status should be targeted.
The New Public Management (NPM) movement of the 1980s generated an influx of private sector management tools 
into public organizations (Hood 1991; Osborne 
2006). Instruments such as strategic planning, 
performance appraisal, and management by 
objectives became the core of the public manager’s 
toolbox. Because the private sector was considered 
a “role model” in efficiency and effectiveness, it 
was argued that these tools could also generate 
a more efficient and effective government 
(Diefenbach 2009). In recent years, insights from 
service management have complemented these 
more organization-oriented management tools 
with client-oriented management tools such as 
client surveys and quality management systems. 
These tools, it has been argued, can help public 
organizations become more responsive to the needs 
of their clients—thus answering the call for a more 
service-dominant approach to public management 
(Osborne, Radnor, and Nasi 2013).
At the heart of management tools’ popularity is the 
assumption that these tools contribute to public 
service performance—be it indicators of efficiency 
and effectiveness or indicators of responsiveness 
(Andrews and Van de Walle 2013; Walker and 
Andrews 2015). Indeed, empirical evidence has 
emerged to support positive outcomes resulting from 
the use of organization-oriented and client-oriented 
management tools by public organizations (e.g., 
Audenaert et al. 2016; Poister, Pasha, and Edwards 
2013), and recent meta-analyses have confirmed 
the significant and positive association, on balance, 
between several management tools and public service 
performance (Gerrish 2016; Walker and Andrews 
2015). At the same time, critics have argued that 
adopting management tools does not always make 
sense and does not contribute to productivity or 
efficiency. Andrews (2010), for instance, reviewed 
studies on the introduction of performance 
management in public organizations and found that 
this made little difference to organizational efficiency. 
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Similarly, Hood and Dixon (2015) painted a less positive picture 
of the effect of three decades of managerialist government reforms 
on economy and efficiency. Likewise, research has suggested that 
management tools are sometimes adopted for reasons of individual 
and organizational legitimacy and mimicry, rather than for 
improving performance (Dahler-Larsen 2000).
Despite the overall popularity of management tools in public 
organizations as well as the evidence supporting (mainly) positive 
outcomes, widespread heterogeneity of tool use has been observed 
throughout the public sector, and little evidence has been uncovered 
aimed at explaining that heterogeneity (George and Desmidt 2014; 
Poister, Pitts, and Edwards 2010). Several authors have looked at 
management tool use across public organizations (e.g., Berry 1994; 
Poister and Streib 1989, 2005) and found significant individual, 
organizational, and sectoral differences in the extent to which 
management tools are used. Nevertheless, few studies have delved 
into the determinants of these differences (George and Desmidt 
2014). Empirical studies have typically looked at management tools 
as something public organizations “have,” a macro process that helps 
explain performance, whereas little is known about tools as something 
that public sector practitioners “do” (Bryson, Crosby, and Bryson 
2009; George, Desmidt et al. 2017). More insights are required into 
the people actually using management tools in their daily practice. 
Hence, this article investigates the determinants of management 
tool use in the public sector and asks, Why are some public sector 
executives more prone to use management tools than others?
Drawing on normative isomorphism (Powell and DiMaggio 1991), 
we hypothesize that public sector executives who have significant 
private sector experience, who have a management degree, who 
hold high hierarchical positions, and who work in organizations 
that have unclear goals are more likely to use management tools as 
a mechanism to enhance their legitimacy. We complement these 
hypotheses with insights from contingency theory (Donaldson 
2001) and argue that public sector executives working in bigger 
organizations with clear goals and executive status are more prone to 
use management tools because of their organizational context. These 
hypotheses are tested using a cross-sectional, large-N survey of 4,533 
public sector executives from 18 European countries. Two country 
and sector fixed-effects ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
models are constructed: one focused on organization-oriented 
management tools as the dependent variable and one focused on 
client-oriented management tools as the dependent variable.
This article contributes to the public management literature in that 
it is one of the first large-N empirical studies to investigate the role 
of normative isomorphism and contingency theory in explaining 
management tool use in public organizations and to use a sample 
of central government executives from 18 European countries. 
Insights into the determinants of management tool use can help 
explain the current heterogeneous situation in the public sector and 
provide policy makers with evidence on where to prioritize efforts 
when devising and implementing public management reforms. 
We also identify the applicability of normative isomorphism 
and contingency theory as theoretical frameworks within public 
management and assess which of the two frameworks has the 
strongest explanatory value in the specific case of management tool 
use by public sector executives.
Moreover, by using data from 18 European countries, the 
predominant Anglophile focus of public management literature 
is complemented by a broader European perspective. This is no 
trivial matter, as recent insights have emphasized the importance of 
context and culture when investigating core questions within public 
management (Meier, Rutherford, and Avellaneda 2017; O’Toole and 
Meier 2015). We account for this contextual reality by using evidence 
from 18 European countries and by identifying—through a country 
and sector fixed-effects model—which findings on management tool 
use hold across these European countries and sectors. Indeed, there are 
several differences between the European Union (EU) and U.S. public 
sectors, where most research has been focused, including the more 
extensive regulatory environment within the EU as well as the stronger 
influence of labor unions (Löfstedt and Vogel 2001). Additionally, 
public organizations within the EU experience less autonomy, stronger 
political control, and more regulated labor markets than their U.S. 
counterparts (Meier, Rutherford, and Avellaneda 2017). These 
contextual differences thus make the EU a particularly interesting 
setting to complement current U.S.-based studies.
We first present our hypotheses based on normative isomorphism 
and contingency theory. Next, we elaborate on our methods and 
data. We present the results from two country and sector fixed-
effects OLS regression models and discuss the implications of our 
findings for public management theory and practice.
Theory and Hypotheses
There is an established research tradition that describes the use 
and diffusion of management tools in the public sector. Studies 
have looked at management tools in general (e.g., Poister and 
Streib 1994; Rivenbark and Kelly 2003) as well as specific tools 
such as management accounting (e.g., Lapsley and Wright 2004), 
performance measurement (e.g., Poister and Streib 1999; Torres, 
Pina, and Yetano 2011), management by objectives (e.g., Poister and 
Streib 1995), and strategic planning (e.g., Berry and Wechsler 1995; 
Poister and Streib 2005). These studies have predominantly focused 
on U.S. and U.K. local government, with some notable exceptions. 
For instance, Botner (1985) investigated management tool use 
at the U.S. state level. Damonte, Dunlop, and Radaelli (2014) 
looked at the use of policy control tools in 17 European countries. 
Van Dooren (2005) centered on performance measurement at the 
Flemish regional government level, and Jeannot and Guillemot 
(2013) focused on management tool use in French central 
government departments.
Typically, these studies describe the presence of management 
tools and potential differences across groups, whereas explaining 
these differences has received limited attention. More recent 
work has attempted to explain variation in and effects of the use 
of management tools, generally couched under the conceptual 
umbrella of innovation diffusion (e.g., Walker, Damanpour, 
and Devece 2010; Hansen 2011) or normative and mimetic 
isomorphism (e.g., Pina, Torres, and Yetano 2009). Our article 
builds on this research tradition using two complementary 
theoretical approaches to explain variation in management 
tool use by public sector executives. The first is normative 
isomorphism, and the second is contingency theory. Similar 
studies on the use of management tools have employed exactly this 
theoretical juxtaposition as well, and findings either support their 
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interconnectedness (e.g., Carvalho, Gomes, and Fernandes 2012) 
or mainly support contingency theory (e.g., Lægreid, Roness, and 
Rubecksen 2007). Figure 1 presents the conceptual model, which 
will be discussed in the following sections.
Normative Isomorphism and Management Tool Use
The first theoretical approach is normative isomorphism. The 
managerialization of public sector executives is a process of 
professionalization and standard setting. This means that members 
of the profession will use practices associated with the management 
profession such as organization-oriented and client-oriented 
management tools. This professionalization is “the collective 
struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and 
methods of their work” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, 152).
The shift in public sector executives’ role from being administrators 
to becoming public managers means that members of this 
managerial occupation come to identify themselves not just as 
members of the administrative elite but also as members of the 
managerial profession, adhering to commonly accepted standards 
within that group. To garner legitimacy, they want to present 
themselves as new public managers. This involves embracing 
organization-oriented and client-oriented management tools as the 
method to perform managerial work. This identification with the 
managerial profession has its source in a shared formal education 
and in the existence of professional networks for the formulation 
and diffusion of norms (Ashworth, Boyne, and Delbridge 2009; 
Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Increasingly, also in the public sector, 
such networks and standard setting become transnational and 
international (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006).
Teodoro (2014) looked at whether belonging to a specific profession 
makes managers manage differently. He argued that normative 
isomorphism helps explain “how professions shape executive 
management” (2014, 983). However, in a study on management 
tool use in Norwegian state-level public organizations, Lægreid, 
Roness, and Rubecksen (2007) found that normative isomorphism 
was not a major explanation for such use. This may be explained 
by the insights of Ashworth, Boyne, and Delbridge (2009), who, 
in a study among 101 English public sector organizations, found 
that normative isomorphism had a strong effect on organizational 
strategies and cultures but a weak effect on structures and processes. 
Management tools fit the second category.
There are two reasons why public organizations are a good 
area in which to study normative isomorphism’s impact on 
managers. First, a study by Frumkin and Galaskiewicz (2004) 
found that government organizations are more susceptible than 
private organizations to normative isomorphic pressures, thereby 
confirming one of the hypotheses put forward by Powell and 
DiMaggio (1991). Second, we follow the recommendation of 
Teodoro (2014, 1000) to search “for evidence of normative 
isomorphism,” especially in types of organizations in which 
executives come from different kinds of professions. This 
is particularly the case for European central government 
administrations, in which public sector executives show a trend 
toward managerialism (Van Thiel, Steijn, and Allix 2007) yet still 
have not converged around a shared (public) managerial identity 
(Meyer et al. 2014).
Public sector executives in European countries have a wide variety 
of professional backgrounds. Unlike some other industries, central 
government organizations are not dominated by one particular 
professional group at the managerial level. Some central government 
administrations are largely populated by traditional career 
bureaucrats, who have had legal training and spent most of their 
careers in the public sector. Others are populated by a new brand 
of managers who sometimes have private sector experience and 
management education. There are major country differences, with 
German top executives having enjoyed predominantly legal training 
and French top executives coming from the “Grandes Ècoles,” 
but beyond this, one finds executives coming from a multitude of 
backgrounds and having a diverse set of educational backgrounds, 
ranging from law, political science, and economics to natural 
science, engineering, and medicine (Hammerschmid et al. 2016; 
Thijs, Hammerschmid, and Palaric 2018).
Figure 1  Model Predicting Management Tool Use by Public Sector Executives
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These new public managers distinguish themselves from traditional 
bureaucrats by having more private sector work experience and 
an educational background in management studies (Meyer 
and Hammerschmid 2006; Van Thiel, Steijn, and Allix 2007). 
Management education is expected to have a positive impact on 
management tool use (Jarzabkowski et al. 2013), and having a 
background in the private sector is also expected to contribute 
to the professionalization of the managerial role. Public sector 
executives with a managerial degree and private sector experience 
can be expected, based on normative isomorphism, to more 
strongly associate with the profession of a manager—thus indicating 
that they are particularly prone to the use of management tools 
(Fernández Gutiérrez and Van de Walle 2018). This leads to the 
following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Public sector executives with extensive private 
sector experience are more likely to use management tools.
Hypothesis 2: Public sector executives with a management 
degree are more likely to use management tools.
In many studies on normative isomorphism, scholars have looked 
at professional association membership as a key channel for 
such pressures. Examples are studies looking at membership in 
professional associations, as in the case of accountants (Christensen 
and Parker 2010), or membership in some association that groups 
organizational peers (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004). Top 
public sector management in Europe, however, is a diverse and 
fragmented group, making association membership less suitable 
for the operationalization of normative pressures. However, 
top public officials, especially those working within the same 
policy field, meet regularly at certain forums. An alternative 
operationalization is to consider membership in a select group of 
top public sector executives (i.e., those at the top hierarchical level 
of their organization) as a proxy for such associational membership. 
Top public sector executives belong to a small group of peers, and 
they may feel pressure to use modern management tools in order 
to demonstrate their position as a modern top executive within the 
peer group. In addition, they are a visible group, subject to scrutiny 
by the public and by politicians, especially when they sit at the top 
of the hierarchy, making it necessary for them to use management 
tools for legitimacy purposes. In addition, it can be assumed 
that top public sector executives are exposed to international 
peers through Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and EU meetings, where they also pick up 
new practices (Pal 2012). We therefore hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: Public sector executives at the highest 
hierarchical level of their organization are more likely to use 
management tools.
Powell and DiMaggio (1991) hypothesized that goal ambiguity is 
also a reason why managers might experience normative pressures 
because ambiguous goals imply a necessity to adjust to perceived 
norms as an indicator of legitimacy. The reason is that organizations 
whose goals are not very clear depend on factors other than output 
for their legitimacy, whereas for organizations with clear goals, 
it is easier to demonstrate their relevance and legitimacy. It is 
expected that public sector executives in organizations with high 
goal ambiguity will be subjected to a higher degree of normative 
isomorphism and will use all kinds of modern, almost normative, 
management tools to demonstrate their legitimacy. In relation 
to this, Teodoro (2014) argued that public organizations have 
particularly ambiguous and competing goals. Hence, the power 
of normative isomorphism will be especially strong because the 
managerial profession, and its use of management tools, provides 
norms on how to run a public organization (Teodoro 2014). To 
summarize, when an organization has unclear goals, it is hard to 
show that it is actually doing a good job. Hence, management tools 
can help demonstrate to the outside world that the organization is 
a real, legitimate organization that uses the same tools that other 
professional organizations use. For this reason, we hypothesize the 
following:
Hypothesis 4a: Public sector executives who perceive their 
organization to have high goal ambiguity are more likely to 
use management tools.
Contingency Theory and Management Tool Use
In their study of management tool use in Norwegian state-level 
public organizations, Lægreid, Roness, and Rubecksen (2007) 
concluded that neo-institutionalist approaches are insufficient to 
explain tool use. Instead, they suggested that tool use is largely 
driven by the “functional applicability of the tool” (Lægreid, Roness, 
and Rubecksen 2007, 407), and therefore contingency-based 
explanations may be of more use. Contingency theory argues that 
organizational structure and management behavior are contingent 
on the technical task and environment of the organization 
(Donaldson 2001). For instance, early contingency scholars found 
differences in the organizational structure of local government 
authorities depending on contingencies such as size, environment, 
interdependence, and change (Hinings, Greenwood, and Ranson 
1975).
Contingency studies have shown that organizations that are 
characterized by standardization and formalization can be expected 
to more easily use management tools (Pugh et al. 1968). Burns 
and Stalker (1961) drew attention to one important aspect of 
standardization and formalization within organizations: goal clarity. 
When goals are clear, this leads to measurable outputs related to 
those goals—which, in turn, makes it easier to use management 
tools geared toward goal formulation and implementation. For 
instance, Van Dooren (2005) found that having measurable outputs 
in the organization was related to a higher uptake of performance 
measurement tools. Contingency theory would thus predict a higher 
use of management tools in organizations with goal clarity. This 
implies that the theoretical predictions on goal ambiguity/clarity 
emanating from contingency theory are exactly the opposite of 
those emanating from normative isomorphism. To summarize, clear 
goals imply easier to measure and manage processes and outputs 
which, in turn, make it easier to use management tools because of 
the strong fit between how management tools work (i.e., based on 
goals, indicators, etc.) and what is happening in the organization. 
We hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4b: Public sector executives who perceive their 
organization to have high goal clarity are more likely to use 
management tools.
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A more prosaic contingency factor is organizational size. On the 
one hand, organizational size increases the need to use management 
tools to control the organization and to know what is happening 
within the organization and in its environment (Van Dooren 2005). 
On the other hand, organizational size is also indicative of the 
administrative and financial capacity to actually implement and use 
management tools. Earlier studies of the use of management tools 
have indeed demonstrated the importance of organizational size 
(e.g., Botner 1985; Lægreid, Roness, and Rubecksen 2007; Poister 
and McGowan 1984)—resulting in following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Public sector executives who work in bigger 
organizations are more likely to use management tools.
Third, task matters. For instance, in their study of Norwegian 
state-level public organizations, Lægreid, Roness, and Rubecksen 
(2007) found that service-providing organizations are more likely to 
use quality management tools. Public organizations with executive 
status, as delivery organizations, are typically involved in routine, 
standardized, repetitive tasks and work directly with clients. As a 
result, we can expect these organizations to be more likely to use 
management tools compared with ministries. Moreover, public 
organizations with executive status have been particularly influenced 
by NPM’s emphasis on being more responsive to clients as well as 
efficient and effective—resulting in a natural need for organization-
oriented and client-oriented management tools (Lægreid, Roness, 
and Rubecksen 2007). This results in our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: Public sector executives who work in public 
organizations with executive status are more likely to use 
management tools.
Methods
Data
This article relies on data from the COCOPS (Coordinating for 
Cohesion in the Public Service of the Future) Top Public Executive 
Survey, a population survey of top public sector executives in central 
government in European countries collected as part of a large 
collaborative European research project (http://www.cocops.eu) 
(see Hammerschmid et al. 2016). It is a population survey because 
it targeted the entire population of central government managers—
including the regional level in federal countries—at the highest 
hierarchical levels, following a detailed mapping of government 
structures, top positions, and their incumbents by national research 
teams in each of the 18 participating European countries (Germany, 
France, Spain, Italy, Estonia, Norway, the United Kingdom, The 
Netherlands, Hungary, Austria, Portugal, Lithuania, Ireland, 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Croatia).
The total N is 6,824, or an average response rate per country of 
31.50 percent. Response rates vary per country, ranging from 51 
percent in Iceland or just above 40 percent in Finland and Sweden 
to just under 18 percent in Spain and Italy. Data were collected 
using a standardized questionnaire in the local language based on an 
English-language master questionnaire, using a combination of online 
questionnaires and paper-based questionnaires where local practice 
dictated such an approach or where initial response rates were too 
low. The COCOPS survey included questions on the use of NPM-
driven, organization-oriented management tools such as strategic 
planning as well as service-driven, client-oriented management tools 
such as client surveys. The survey, method, description and data set 
are available in open access through the Gesis Social Science Data 
(Archive: https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/).
In our analyses, we decided to not include respondents who had 
missing values on any of our variables. This is particularly the case 
for respondents who indicated they were not able to assess the 
extent of management tool use for certain management instruments; 
for that reason, they were removed from the data set. This reduced 
our data set to a total N of 4,533 public sector executives for our 
model predicting organization-oriented management tool use and 
4,489 public sector executives for our model predicting client-
oriented management tool use. We tested for nonresponse bias by 
conducting a time-trend extrapolation test comparing early and 
late respondents in the different country samples. In this test, the 
replies of two groups of early and late respondents were compared to 
assess whether replies significantly differed over time; no significant 
differences emerged. Moreover, sampling issues were avoided by 
surveying our entire population as opposed to extracting a sample 
framework (Lee, Benoit-Bryan, and Johnson 2012).
Because we are dealing with administrative elites who can be easily 
identified, privacy considerations were important, and therefore no 
administrative data on the respondents’ organization could be linked 
to the survey answers. All data about the respondents’ organization 
were thus provided by the respondents themselves. The strict privacy 
considerations meant that only limited representativeness checks 
could be performed on the data, but a number of such checks at the 
country level and on respondents’ gender showed no major biases 
(Hammerschmid, Van de Walle, and Stimac 2013).
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in this study are the use of management 
tools as reported by public sector executives. For a series of 
management tools, respondents were asked, “To what extent are 
the following instruments used in your organization?” This was 
measured on a seven-point scale, ranging from “not at all” to “to 
a large extent.” Respondents were also explicitly offered a “cannot 
access” option, because not all public sector executives may be fully 
aware of the type of managements tools used throughout their 
organization. This resulted in missing data for specific financial 
management tools.
Because management tools typically have different outcomes (i.e., 
efficiency and effectiveness focus of organization-oriented, NPM-
driven tools versus responsiveness focus of client-oriented, service-
driven tools), we performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
on the list of eight management tools using principal component 
analysis (PCA) with an oblique rotation (see table 1). We use PCA 
because we aim to make statements based on our data and thus 
do not seek to extrapolate beyond our data, and we use oblique 
rotation because we expect our management tool factors to be 
correlated (Field 2013). The EFA resulted in two factors, which 
we have labeled “organization-oriented tools” and “client-oriented 
tools.” Both factors had acceptable Cronbach’s alphas (> .70).
Before proceeding with the analysis, we first present a number of 
descriptive findings at the country level to provide context to our 
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two dependent variables. Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide histograms 
containing the country averages across our sample for both 
organization-oriented management tool use and client-oriented 
management tool use. As these figures show, organization-oriented 
management tool use seems to be—on average—highest in the 
United Kingdom and Sweden and lowest in Spain and Hungary. 
Interestingly enough, these findings do not hold for client-oriented 
management tool use, with Lithuania and the Netherlands 
scoring highest and Croatia and Germany scoring lowest. While 
these findings give some general insights into the role of different 
administrative systems in explaining management tool use, it is 
important to note that these figures are based on broad averages 
across countries, and in-depth comparative case studies should 
be conducted to better contextualize these findings. Explaining 
between-country differences is not the focus of this study. Hence, 
as will be seen later on, we use country fixed effects to account for 
potential variation in management tool use attributable to country-
level variables.1
Independent Variables
The two theoretical processes at work and the resulting set of 
hypotheses are operationalized as follows. For normative pressure, 
we measured private sector working experience as follows: “How 
many years of work experience outside the public sector do you 
have? In the private sector?” The categories included none, less than 
1 year, 1–5 years, 5–10 years, 10–20 years, and more than 20 years. 
Having a management education was measured by asking, “What 
was the subject of your highest educational qualification?,” with 
management/business/economics being one of the categories. To 
establish the respondent’s hierarchical position, we asked, “What 
kind of position do you currently hold?,” with three answer 
categories: the top hierarchical level in the organization, the second 
hierarchical level in the organization, and the third hierarchical 
level in the organization. Goal ambiguity/clarity is a scale variable 
consisting of four items based on the work of Jung (2011) measured 
on a seven-point strongly disagree/strongly agree scale: (1) “Our 
goals are clearly stated,” (2) “Our goals are communicated to all 
staff,” (3) “It is easy to observe and measure our activities,” and (4) 
“We mainly measure inputs and processes” (Cronbach’s alpha .724). 
A high score on this variable implies goal clarity, whereas a low score 
implies goal ambiguity.
Contingency variables included in this study are organizational 
size, measured as the total number of employees in the 
organization (<50, 50–99, 100–499, 500–999, 1,000–5,000, 
>5000); executive status—whether or not the respondent works 
for an executive or subordinate government body rather than a 
ministry-type organization; and goal ambiguity/clarity (see earlier 
description).
Table 1  Factor Loadings of Management Tools
Management Tool
Organization-Oriented 
Tools
Client-Oriented  
Tools
Performance appraisal .827
Management by objectives .775
Risk management .757
Business/strategic planning .694
Cost accounting systems .643
Service points for clients .935
Clients/user surveys .639
Quality management systems .510
Cronbach’s alpha .803 .716
Notes: Principal component analysis with oblique rotation. The two factors explain 
61% of total variance.
Figure 2  Histogram of Country Averages of Organization-Oriented Management Tool Use
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Finally, a number of sociodemographic control variables (gender, 
age, level of education) were added to control for differences in 
responses and related nonresponse patterns. Moreover, the policy 
sectors within which the respondent works were also added to 
control for management tool use variation related to policy-sector-
specific characteristics. Similarly, country dummies were included to 
control for country-specific characteristics.
To provide further insights into the types of organizations included 
in our sample, we added some descriptives concerning our 
organizational-level variables (namely goal clarity, organizational 
size, and executive status). First of all, the average score for goal 
clarity is 4.93 (min = 1, max = 7) with a standard deviation of 
1.27. On average, the included organizations tend to have rather 
clear goals, but there is quite some variation around the mean. 
Second, most organizations constitute 100–499 employees (about 
35 percent), whereas the other size categories are more evenly 
distributed (1,000–5,000 employees about 15 percent, 500–999 
employees about 14 percent, above 5,000 employees about 13 
percent, fewer than 50 employees about 13 percent, and 50–99 
employees about 9 percent). Finally, most of the organizations 
are agencies (about 55 percent), although there are still a lot of 
ministries included in the sample (45 percent).
Common Source Bias
This study uses a single, self-reported survey to measure all variables. 
This implies that common source bias (CSB) could be an issue. 
We use the recent recommendations of George and Pandey (2017) 
to investigate and discuss CSB issues in our data. First, most of 
our independent variables are demographic characteristics or 
organizational characteristics that one can expect to be factual (i.e., 
private sector experience, management education, top hierarchical 
position, organizational size, executive status of organization). 
It is unlikely that these variables suffer from CSB. Second, one 
of our independent variables (i.e., goal clarity/ambiguity) is 
perceptual and might be influenced by CSB when correlated with 
perceptions of management tool use. However, the Harman’s 
single factor test on the items underlying these variables does not 
support the assumption that the correlations are strongly inflated 
by CSB (i.e., 42 percent of variance explained by single factor). 
Third, the variables under investigation in our article are not 
part of the set of variables argued to suffer from CSB by previous 
public administration articles—we should not assume CSB to be 
a prima facie inflator of our correlations. Fourth, the survey used 
in our analysis is the first to measure our variables across European 
countries and with top public sector executives—there is simply no 
archival data available for us to use in substitute of the survey.
Statistical Analysis
We use OLS regression analysis to test the hypotheses. In what 
follows, we present some of the essential information underlying 
our choice for this technique as recommended by Lee, Benoit-
Bryan, and Johnson (2012). Although the items of our dependent 
variables were initially measured on an ordinal scale, the commuted 
overall score looks at the average score across items and is no longer 
ordinal—a linear model is preferred. Before conducting the OLS 
regression analysis, we need to ensure that our model adheres to the 
assumptions underlying OLS regression analysis.
Figure 3  Histogram of Country Averages of Client-Oriented Management Tool Use
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First, we assess potential issues of multicollinearity by investigating 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the included predictors. 
None of the observed VIFs exceeds a value of 10, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not an issue. An explanation for this is related 
to the high variation in public organizations across the sample, with 
very large agencies but also very large ministries, and an allocation 
of certain delivery tasks (with high goal clarity) to agencies in some 
systems but to ministries in others. Second, we assess the normality 
assumption of the regression residuals by looking at the normal 
P–P plot of the residuals as well as the associated histogram. Both 
figures indicate normally distributed residuals. We also adhere to 
the normality assumption.
Third, we address the assumption of individual independence. 
Our sample of public sector executives are nested in countries, 
sectors, and organizations—they are not independent. We include 
dummies for country and sector to account for clustering at these 
levels (i.e., a country and sector fixed-effects model). Because we 
do not have data on the organization to which executives belong, 
we cannot account for clustering at the organizational level. Hence, 
our hypotheses based on contingency theory could suffer from type 
I error because these organizational level variables are “stretched” 
to the individual level. To provide credence to our findings, we 
included a robustness check: we ran the model again but only 
included data from the highest hierarchal level of public sector 
executives (i.e., 995 respondents). There should be very few of 
these respondents who share the same organization thus strongly 
minimizing type I error. If our robustness check does not differ 
from our original findings concerning contingency theory, we argue 
these findings to be robust.
Fourth, we test for the absence of heteroscedasticity—or “fanning 
out”—of our residuals by looking at the individual scatter 
plots and conducting the Breusch-Pagan test. No indication 
of heteroscedasticity is present. Finally, we test for influential 
observations by calculating the Cook’s distance. No distance is 
above the cutoff point of 1. We can now move on to the actual 
results of our analyses.
Results
Two country and sector fixed-effects OLS regression models 
are presented in table 2. The first model includes the use of 
organization-oriented management tools as the dependent 
variable, and the second model includes the use of client-oriented 
management tools as dependent variable. Both models are 
statistically significant. Model 1 explains almost half of the variation 
in the use of organization-oriented management tools, and model 
2 explains about one-third of the variation in the use of client-
oriented management tools.
Looking at the normative pressures, our analyses indicate that 
only one of our four hypotheses can be accepted. Private sector 
experience has little impact on management tool use.2 Only when 
public sector executives have more than 20 years of private sector 
experience are they more likely to use client-oriented management 
tools. In all other cases, private sector experience has a limited part 
to play, resulting in the rejection of hypothesis 1. The impact of 
having a management degree is also not significant.3 Public sector 
executives who studied business, management, or economics are not 
more likely to use management tools (i.e., rejection of hypothesis 
2). However, as expected based on normative isomorphism, 
public sector executives at the highest hierarchical level of their 
organization are more likely to use both organization-oriented and 
client-oriented management tools compared with those at lower 
levels (i.e., acceptance of hypothesis 3).
Finally, goal ambiguity is not a significant positive predictor of 
management tool use—rather, the exact opposite is the case. When 
assessing the role of goal clarity/ambiguity in management tool 
use, the arguments of contingency theory are more applicable than 
those of normative isomorphism: goal clarity positively relates to 
management tool use as opposed to negatively (i.e., acceptance of 
hypothesis 4b and rejection of hypothesis 4a). Importantly, when 
looking at the standardized regression coefficients of all predictors, 
we find that goal clarity is by far the strongest predictor of both 
organization-oriented and client-oriented management tool use.
Apart from the role of goal clarity, the other two hypotheses based 
on contingency theory are also accepted. Public sector executives 
working in bigger organizations are more likely to use management 
tools (i.e., acceptance of hypothesis 5), and the same holds for 
those working in public organizations with executive status (i.e., 
acceptance of hypothesis 6). Looking at our controls, gender and 
education level have limited impact, but age does have a significant 
impact—with public sector executives aged 56–65 being most likely 
to use organization-oriented and client-oriented management tools.
To check for potential type I errors in our analyses of the 
contingency-theory-based variables (see “Statistical analysis”), we 
reran the foregoing models but this time only used data from the 
executives at the highest hierarchical level of their organization 
(i.e., 995 respondents). In both models, the exact same results 
were uncovered (i.e., goal clarity significant positive and strongest 
predictor, organizational size significant positive predictor, and 
executive status significant positive predictor). This robustness check 
confirms the validity of our initial findings and the limited impact 
of type I error.
Discussion
This article used a cross-country, large-N survey of European 
public sector executives to answer following question: which public 
sector executives are particularly prone to the use of management 
tools? Hypotheses were defined based on normative isomorphism 
and contingency theory, and two country and sector fixed-effects 
OLS regression models were used to test these hypotheses. The 
models indicate that public sector executives who have the highest 
hierarchical positions in their organization and work in bigger 
organizations with perceived goal clarity and executive status are 
more prone to using management tools. This finding implies 
that, in the particular case of management tool use by public 
sector executives, contingency theory outperforms normative 
isomorphism. There are several implications of these findings for 
public management theory and practice.
Although normative isomorphism is argued to be a potent 
framework to predict management tool use in organizational theory 
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991), our findings do not support its 
importance. Management education and private sector experience 
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did not seem to spark a need for more management tool use by the 
surveyed public sector executives—despite our argument that these 
normative pressures would generate a sense of belonging to the 
management profession and thus a norm to use management tools. 
Nevertheless, one normative pressure did have an important part 
to play: hierarchical level. In line with our argument, public sector 
executives at the highest hierarchical level of their organization 
can be argued to belong to a professional group of top-level 
public managers who are strongly scrutinized by the public and 
by politicians and thus more likely to use management tools in 
their search for legitimacy. This finding gives some credence to the 
applicability of normative isomorphism in explaining the use of 
public management practices (complementing the findings of, e.g., 
Decramer et al. 2012).
We would like to emphasize that although our findings on 
normative isomorphism are not particularly potent, there are other 
isomorphic pressures that we did not investigate. Specifically, 
Table 2  OLS Regression Results
Independent Variable
Organization-Oriented Tools Client-Oriented Tools
B (s.e.) β B (s.e.) β
Constant 2.454*** (.128) n/a .246 (.174) n/a
Normative pressures
Private sector experience (none/less than 1 year is reference)
 1–5 years –.046 (.034) –.016 .011 (.046) .003
 5–10 years –.068 (.051) –.015 .074 (.069) .014
 10–20 years –.040 (.059) –.008 .116 (.081) .019
 More than 20 years –.073 (.080) –.010 .275* (.109) .033
Degree type (other degree is reference)
 Management .011 (.035) .003 –.011 (.048) –.003
Hierarchical level (third level is reference)
 Second hierarchical level .069+ (.037) .025 .088+ (.050) .028
 Top hierarchical level .226*** (.045) .070 .213** (.062) .056
Organizational contingencies
Organizational size (<50 employees is reference)
 50–99 employees .116+ (.067) .025 .383*** (.091) .071
 100–499 employees .324*** (.056) .117 .610*** (.075) .187
 500–999 employees .347*** (.063) .092 .675*** (.085) .152
 1.000–5.000 employees .415*** (.064) .112 .844*** (.086) .192
 Over 5,000 employees .473*** (.067) .118 1.104*** (.092) .233
Executive status (ministry is reference)
 Executive status .181*** (.036) .067 .735*** (.049) .231
Goal clarity .556*** (.014) .461 .517*** (.019) .362
Controls
Gender (male is reference)
 Female .026 (.031) .009 .067 (.042) .020
Age (35 years old or less is reference)
 36–45 years old .055 (.071) .017 .174+ (.097) .046
 46–55 years old .116+ (.070) .043 .267** (.096) .083
 56–65 years old .151* (.072) .052 .326** (.099) .094
 66 years old or older .091 (.167) .006 .236 (.227) .014
Educational level (graduate degree/other is reference)
 Postgraduate degree (MA level) –.024 (.044) –.008 .075 (.060) .023
 PhD/doctoral degree –.076 (.057) –.020 –.050 (.077) –.011
R2 .487 .328
Adjusted R2 .481 .320
F 81.727*** 41.671***
N 4,533 4,489
Notes: Dummies for country and sector were included to control for the variation attributable to country- or sector-level variables. These are not presented in the table.
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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we encourage future research to include the role of coercive 
isomorphism (i.e., formal rules and regulations) and mimetic 
isomorphism (i.e., copying successful organizations) in explaining 
management tool use within the public sector (Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991). Previous studies have indicated the importance 
of these pressures for public management practices (e.g., Ashworth, 
Boyne, and Delbridge 2009; George, Baekgaard et al. 2018).
We join the findings of Lægreid, Roness, and Rubecksen (2007) by 
uncovering the importance of contingency theory over normative 
isomorphism. Indeed, all three hypotheses based on contingency theory 
were accepted (Donaldson 2001). Public sector executives working in 
bigger organizations are more likely to use management tools because 
of the capacity underlying such organizations. Size has been argued to 
be a proxy for professionalization—that is, bigger public organizations 
are more professionalized—and our findings give further credence 
to this assumption (e.g., Andrews and Boyne 2010; Jung 2013). 
Moreover, because of the standardization of practices and direct contact 
with clients, public sector executives working in public organizations 
with executive status are more likely to indicate management tool use. 
Future research could assess why. In particular, it would be interesting 
to uncover the conditions under which public sector executives 
working in ministries are still likely to use management tools, as well 
as those working in smaller public organizations.
Throughout our models, one contingency variable emerged as the 
strongest predictor of management tool use: perceived goal clarity. 
Those public sector executives who perceived their organization to 
have clear goals were also more likely to use management tools. The 
impact of this finding cannot be underestimated. Goal clarity is not 
always a typical characteristic of public organizations—quite the 
opposite has been argued (e.g., Chun and Rainey 2005; Jung 2011). 
Nonetheless, evidence has emerged arguing that goal clarity is an 
antecedent of public service performance and clearly matters (e.g., 
Jung 2014). Our study indicates that goal clarity also has beneficial 
impact on management tool use, and this finding could indicate 
that management tool use is a mediating variable in the goal clarity/
public service performance relation. Indeed, it could be that goal 
clarity, in part, contributes to public service performance because 
it enhances management tools use in public organizations. This 
observation is, at the moment, speculative, and we encourage future 
research to look into management tool use as a potential mediator 
in the goal clarity/public service performance relation.
An alternative view on the relation between goal clarity and 
management tool use, but one that cannot be tested in the 
framework of the current article, theory, and data, is that using 
management tools reduces ambiguity in the organization by forcing 
its operations within a common mold. In other words, there could 
be some reversed causality such that using management tools 
might help create goal clarity—thus allowing managers to be more 
reflexive and able to manage ambiguity. At the moment, however, 
this is speculative, and we encourage future work to explore this 
theoretical assumption.
Our findings have clear implications for policy makers and public 
managers. In the past couple of decades, public management 
reforms have become widespread in public organizations at all levels 
of government (Diefenbach 2009). Our results suggest that one 
standardized approach to implementing and assessing the progress 
of these reforms is unrealistic. Different organizations require 
different support and guidelines. It might be easier for bigger 
organizations with clear goals, standardized activities, and contact 
with clients to use management tools, whereas other organizations 
might struggle to meet the requirements and require more training 
as well as resources. Similarly, public managers should take into 
account the context in which they work and understand that this 
context will influence their intent to implement new managerial 
practices. We encourage a contingency approach to management 
tools in public organizations, in which policy makers and public 
managers investigate the context in which they work and adapt their 
reform initiatives and practices accordingly (see, e.g., Bryson, Berry, 
and Yang 2010; Poister, Pitts, and Edwards 2010 Woods 2009).
Limitations
Although our article is one of the first to investigate the 
determinants of management tool use by public sector executives 
across 18 European countries, some limitations need to be 
acknowledged. First, although we argued that CSB is not much of 
an issue in our analyses, using a cross-sectional survey does imply 
issues of endogeneity. Our findings are limited to associations, 
and we cannot make statements on causality (George and Pandey 
2017). We suggest that future research address this issue by using, 
for instance, research designs based on difference-in-differences or 
longitudinal analyses.
Second, we chose to use cross-country data as a means to generalize 
our findings beyond specific countries. We did not aim to explain 
between-country variance, and we encourage other authors to 
investigate that variance by looking at country-level variables. 
The external contingencies of public organizations are different 
depending on the country. Such contingencies include the political 
environment (e.g., more conservative versus more liberal political 
leadership), administrative system and culture (e.g., western versus 
southern European traditions), or external pressures to implement 
savings (e.g., austerity regimes). Also, the ways in which managers 
are recruited may differ substantially (e.g., having a central 
independent body responsible for recruitment versus political 
appointments), which means that the group of top public managers 
in one country may display more of the characteristics of being a 
profession than that in other countries. It is therefore important for 
future studies to look in more detail at country-level determinants 
(see also Jeannot, Van de Walle, and Hammerschmid 2018).
Third, because of anonymity issues, we cannot assign respondents 
to specific organizations. This implies that the organizational-level 
variables in our model (i.e., organizational size and organizational 
type) might suffer from type I error (false positives) because these 
data are “stretched” to the individual level (Hox 2010)—although 
our robustness check did not identify substantial type I error. 
In addition, such anonymity made it difficult to collect data on 
professional associations and networks to allow for a more fine-
grained operationalization of normative isomorphic pressures and 
also inhibited further analysis of the exact tasks of the organization 
as well as the type of agency involved. We encourage future 
research to offer a more detailed operationalization of normative 
isomorphism and contingency theory—including, for instance, the 
profession the manager comes from and their exposure to OECD 
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or other European networks as well as different agency types (e.g., 
delivery versus advisory function).
Finally, we focused on formal education as a measurement of 
normative pressures. However, many training initiatives concerning 
management tools exist in government—although not necessarily 
resulting in formal degrees. This might imply that while an 
executive does not have a formal education in management, 
business, or economics he or she is still very knowledgeable about 
management tools because of a series of trainings and seminars. 
Future research can address this limitation by not only focusing on 
formal degrees but also assessing the impact of trainings, seminars, 
and other lifelong learning initiatives.
Conclusion
Management tool use is often argued to be the result of normative 
pressures experienced by managers as well as the contingencies of 
the organizations in which they work. In our study on public sector 
executives from 18 European countries, we find that organizational 
contingencies matter more than normative pressures in explaining 
management tool use. This suggests a better applicability of 
contingency theory over neo-institutional theories when predicting 
management tool use in a public sector setting. Future research can 
build on this finding and juxtapose other institutional pressures 
and contingencies than those included in our survey—including 
coercive and mimetic pressures or contingencies related to the 
environment of the organization. For practice, these findings 
suggest that public management reforms cannot neglect context—
smaller public organizations with goal ambiguity and nonexecutive 
status are less inclined to adopt these tools and might require more 
training and support.
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Notes
1. One might argue that management tool use depends on country-level variables 
as opposed to being part of a manager’s own discretion. Importantly, our data do 
not support this proposition. In another article (Jeannot, Van de Walle, and 
Hammerschmid 2018), we found that performance appraisal use has the highest 
degree of variation explained by country—but this is still only 30 percent. In 
other words, non-country-level variables explain the majority of variation in 
management tool use, which further validates our analysis.
2. One might argue that this is due to the limited number of public sector 
executives with private sector experience. However, only 26 percent of our 
sample had no private sector experience, whereas 22 percent had more than five 
years of private sector experience.
3. A similar argument might be applied to management education—few public 
sector executives have it. Again, the numbers show a different trend with over a 
quarter of the respondents (26.5 percent) coming from a business, management, 
or economics education.
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